Network Challenge - 001 - Solution

I Wanted to send a big thanks out to everyone who sent solutions in for the Network challenge. While there were many responses, two (2) stood out amongst the rest. I don't plan on doing prizes for all of these contests, but I was so impressed by these responses, that I wanted to do something special on this ocassion. The winners of this first challenge are:

• First Place: @dfir_it ($150 amazon Gift Card) Solution is below
• Second Place: @CYINT_DUDE ($50 Amazon Gift Card) Solution

The first place solution is so well written, that I figured it was worth posting in it's entirety here (with permission from the author of course). See below for the solution, and keep any eye on dfir.it where the author intends to post more details on how he arrived at the answers you see below.

@dfir_it Winning Contest Submission:

Network Challenge - 001 - Linux

One of my favorite sites is "Malware Traffic Analysis" where the author routinely posts network challenges. In the spirit of contributing to this effort of providing material for analysts to sharpen their skills, I developed a challenge focused around a popular scenario I often come across in research and other analysis efforts. As a heads up, any malware you may come across in the analysis of this PCAP is in fact real malware. Please take care in how you analyze. 

When reviewing this PCAP and writing your response please keep in mind what you would really want in an investigation. The questions I ask at the end of this article are intentionally vague, as I didn't want to give too much away with the questions. What I am hoping to see in responses is that the analysts are able to adequately tell a story of what likely occurred, identify network and host indicators that can help further scope this incident, and write detection rules in the detection languages of their choice to find future instances of this activity. 

PCAP DOWNLOAD

The due date for submissions is September 25, 2016. Enjoy!

Scenario:

Client provides a PCAP involving all traffic they have from a victim Linux server.  A snort signature alerted for files downloaded from an HFS server. The client does not have any other context to provide. Other than the following is the Snort Signature that was alerted on:

alert tcp any any -> any any (msg:"HFS [File Download]";flow:to_client,established; content:"HFS 2.";distance:0; content:"HFS_SID="; classtype:suspicious; sid:999999; rev:1;)

Objective:

1. Determine what likely occurred based on the evidence from the PCAP.
2. Identify any network and/or host artifacts that could be used to scope this incident further.
3. If applicable, write detection signatures (snort/suricata/yara) to increase coverage for this type of activity. 

Submissions:

Feel free to submit your responses directly to NetChallenge[at]tekdefense.com or comment on this blog post with a link to your own article with a response. I'll review responses, and perhaps give out a few prizes to those with great writeups.

Automater Update .21

Keeping Automater up to date:

Download the latest version: https://github.com/1aN0rmus/TekDefense-Automater

One of the more outstanding modifications added to version .21 of Automater is that users no longer need to worry about keeping on top of the GitHub site to ensure all of the python modules are the latest version. With a small addition of a –Vv in the command line arguments, Automater will check if the local python modules match the modules on the TekDefense Automater GitHub site. The –V (--vercheck) argument is actually the argument that tells Automater to check the modules, and the small –v (--verbose) is required to make Automater report the outcome. If the files don’t match, Automater will send a notification to stdout to alert the user to which module has been modified, so up to date modules can be pulled if the user wants. The –v (--verbose) option can be used to turn on or off any information sent to stdout to either silence or allow Automater to talk to stdout.

Arguably an even better option added is yet another “version” check of sorts. The sites.xml file is still required locally so that Automater can get instructions on what sites to check and what regexs to report upon. However, a new tekdefense.xml file is also checked for and utilized if it is found locally. The significance of this is that with a –r (--refreshxml) switch included in the command line argument call, Automater will check the TekDefense Automater GitHub site and pull the tekdefense.xml file for use. If the –r switch is utilized, and the local tekdefense.xml file is found to be different on the local machine, the modified (updated) file on GitHub will be pulled and utilized. This ensures that you have the ability to do your own calls with the sites.xml file, while ALSO maintaining constant calls to sites and checks utilized by the TekDefense crew. Together this gives the Automater use the best coverage with no modifications required or manual processes followed.

New Requirements and what they mean:

The new Automater has several updates. Out of the blocks, the requests module (version 2.7 or above) is now required to run Automater. For instructions on getting the requests module if you don't already have view http://docs.python-requests.org/en/latest/user/install/. This gives us better control of returning HTML and sets us up for further upgrades in the near future when we begin using JSON APIs and data collecting capabilities – more on this as things progress. Using requests, the default timeout of get calls to web sites has now been set to 5 seconds. This allows Automater to move on after 5 seconds of waiting for a response from a web site. However, if a web site does respond and provide some input, but the site is slow in its response time, the get request will not timeout. This timeout is only for those sites that just don’t respond. Further refinements on this subject will continue in future upgrades. There are several bug fixes and other modifications and we will soon thread Automater to provide better response times. For instance the delay feature was fixed.

.\Automater.py -h

usage: Automater.py [-h] [-o OUTPUT] [-b] [-f CEF] [-w WEB] [-c CSV]

                    [-d DELAY] [-s SOURCE] [--proxy PROXY] [-a USERAGENT] [-V]

                    [-r] [-v]

                    target

IP, URL, and Hash Passive Analysis tool

positional arguments:

  target                List one IP Address (CIDR or dash notation accepted),

                        URL or Hash to query or pass the filename of a file

                        containing IP Address info, URL or Hash to query each

                        separated by a newline.

optional arguments:

  -h, --help            show this help message and exit

  -o OUTPUT, --output OUTPUT

                        This option will output the results to a file.

  -b, --bot             This option will output minimized results for a bot.

  -f CEF, --cef CEF     This option will output the results to a CEF formatted

                        file.

  -w WEB, --web WEB     This option will output the results to an HTML file.

  -c CSV, --csv CSV     This option will output the results to a CSV file.

  -d DELAY, --delay DELAY

                        This will change the delay to the inputted seconds.

                        Default is 2.

  -s SOURCE, --source SOURCE

                        This option will only run the target against a

                        specific source engine to pull associated domains.

                        Options are defined in the name attribute of the site

                        element in the XML configuration file. This can be a

                        list of names separated by a semicolon.

  --proxy PROXY         This option will set a proxy to use (eg.

                        proxy.example.com:8080)

  -a USERAGENT, --useragent USERAGENT

                        This option allows the user to set the user-agent seen

                        by web servers being utilized. By default, the user-

                        agent is set to Automater/version

  -V, --vercheck        This option checks and reports versioning for

                        Automater. Checks each python module in the Automater

                        scope. Default, (no -V) is False

  -r, --refreshxml      This option refreshes the tekdefense.xml file from the

                        remote GitHub site. Default (no -r) is False.

  -v, --verbose         This option prints messages to the screen. Default (no

                        -v) is False.

Specific sites (already in the sites.xml or tekdefense.xml file) can be called in case the user only wants responses from specific sites. While previous versions of Automater allowed this function for one site using the –s (--source) switch, the new version allows multiple sites to be utilized by separating the required sites with a semicolon. So in the past, if the user had a sites.xml file with the totalhash_ip entry, the user could call Automater with –s totalhash_ip and only receive information about totalhash. However, if the user now wants more than totalhash output, but not all information in the sites.xml or tekdefense.xml file(s), he could enter something like Automater –s totalhash_ip;robtex to get totalhash and robtex information. Any site within the sites.xml or tekdefense.xml ca be joined in this way using the semicolon separator between sites.

Lastly, there is now a bot output mode for those who want friendlier output for bots. For instance here is the output using Automater with -b in a skype bot.

BSidesNola 2015 Presentation on Honeypots

Wow, it has been a long time since I have posted. I plan to rectify my posting frequency problems, starting now. Last weekend @p4r4n0y1ng and I (@TekDefense) gave a presentation on Honeypots called "Catch More Honeys when you are fly" at BSidesNola. See the slides below:

I will be publishing a more detailed article on SSHPsychos soon!

Over a year with Kippo

UPDATE: After posting @ikoniaris of Honeydrive and Bruteforce fame recommended running these. Here are the results of kippo-stats.pl created by Tomasz Miklas and Miguel jacq.

As many of you know from previous posts, I am a big fan of honeypots, particularly Kippo. My main Kippo instance sitting in AWS has been online for over a year now. Let's take a look at what we have captured and learned over this past year. If you want to validate any of these statistics I have made the raw logs available for download.

General Stats:

Unique values (135526 connections):

*csv with geo location

*Map Generated with JCSOCAL's GIPC

Top 11 Countries

China: 699

United States: 654

Brazil: 76

Russian Federation: 69

Germany: 65

Korea, Republic of: 57

Romania: 56

Egypt: 52

Japan: 50

India: 41

Indonesia: 41

Unique Usernames: 8600 (Username list)

 Unique Passwords: 75780 (wordlist)

Unique Sources: 1985 (list of IPs)

Passwords:

One of my favorite uses of kippo data is to generate wordlists from login attempts. I wrote a quick script to parse the kippo logs and pull out all passwords and unique them into a wordlist. Feel free to grab. Additionally I made the wordlists available for download.

Using Pipal I performed analysis of all the login attempts over this year:

Two items of note here are that over 60% of password attempts were 1-8 characters. 40% of attempts were for lowercase alpha characters only. The most used password was 123456. This is the default pass for Kippo.

If a user attempts to create an account or change the root password in a Kippo session those passwords are captured and added to the allowed credentials list. The following credentials were created:

root:0:albertinoalbert123

root:0:fgashyeq77dhshfa

root:0:florian12eu

root:0:hgd177q891999wwwwwe1.dON

root:0:iphone5

root:0:kokot

root:0:nope

root:0:picvina

root:0:scorpi123

root:0:test

root:0:xiaozhe

root:0:12345

root:0:bnn318da9031kdamfaihheq1fa

root:0:ls

root:0:neonhostt1

root:0:wget123

Downloads:

When an attacker attempts to download a tool via wget, within Kippo we allow that file to be downloaded, although they cannot interact with it. With this we are able to get a copy of whatever is being downloaded. In most cases these are IRC bots, but not all. I have made them all available for download.

Here is a listing of all the files:

*Duplicates and obviously legitimate files have been removed from the list.

20131030113401_http___198_2_192_204_22_disknyp

20131103183232_http___61_132_227_111_8080_meimei

20131104045744_http___198_2_192_204_22_disknyp

20131114214017_http___www_unrealircd_com_downloads_Unreal3_2_8_1_tar_gz

20131116130541_http___198_2_192_204_22_disknyp

20131129165151_http___dl_dropboxusercontent_com_s_1bxj9ak8m1octmk_ktx_c

20131129165438_http___dl_dropboxusercontent_com_s_66gpt66lvut4gdu_ktx

20131202040921_http___198_2_192_204_22_disknyp

20131207123419_http___packetstorm_wowhacker_com_DoS_juno_c

20131216143108_http___www_psybnc_at_download_beta_psyBNC_2_3_2_7_tar_gz

20131216143208_http___X_hackersoft_org_scanner_gosh_jpg

20131216143226_http___download_microsoft_com_download_win2000platform_SP_SP3_NT5_EN_US_W2Ksp3_exe

20131217163423_http___ha_ckers_org_slowloris_slowloris_pl

20131217163456_http___www_lemarinel_net_perl

20131222084315_http___maxhub_com_auto_bill_pipe_bot

20140103142644_http___ftp_gnu_org_gnu_autoconf_autoconf_2_69_tar_gz

20140109170001_http___sourceforge_net_projects_cpuminer_files_pooler_cpuminer_2_3_2_linux_x86_tar_gz

20140120152204_http___111_39_43_54_5555_dos32

20140122202342_http___layer1_cpanel_net_latest

20140122202549_http___linux_duke_edu_projects_yum_download_2_0_yum_2_0_7_tar_gz

20140122202751_http___www_ehcp_net_ehcp_latest_tgz

20140201131804_http___www_suplementar_com_br_images_stories_goon_pooler_cpuminer_2_3_2_tar_gz

20140201152307_http___nemo_rdsor_ro_darwin_jpg

20140208081358_http___www_youtube_com_watch_v_6hVQs5ll064

20140208184835_http___sharplase_ru_x_txt

20140215141909_http___tenet_dl_sourceforge_net_project_cpuminer_pooler_cpuminer_2_3_2_tar_gz

20140215142830_http___sourceforge_net_projects_cpuminer_files_pooler_cpuminer_2_3_2_tar_gz

20140219072721_http___www_psybnc_at_download_beta_psyBNC_2_3_2_7_tar_gz

20140328031725_http___dl_dropboxusercontent_com_u_133538399_multi_py

20140409053322_http___www_c99php_com_shell_c99_rar

20140409053728_http___github_com_downloads_orbweb_PHP_SHELL_WSO_wso2_5_1_php

20140413130110_http___www_iphobos_com_hb_unixcod_rar

20140416194008_http___linux_help_bugs3_com_Camel_mail_txt

20140419143734_http___www_activestate_com_activeperl_downloads_thank_you_dl_http___downloads_activestate_com_ActivePerl_releases_5_18_2_1802_ActivePerl_5_18_2_1802_x86_64_linux_glibc_2_5_298023_tar_gz

20140419144043_http___ha_ckers_org_slowloris_slowloris_pl

20140420104056_http___downloads_metasploit_com_data_releases_archive_metasploit_4_9_2_linux_x64_installer_run

20140420104325_http___nmap_org_dist_nmap_6_46_1_i386_rpm

20140505073503_http___116_255_239_180_888_007

20140505093229_http___119_148_161_25_805_sd32

20140505111511_http___112_117_223_10_280_1

20140515091557_http___112_117_223_10_280__bash_6_phpmysql

20140519193800_http___www_unrealircd_com_downloads_Unreal3_2_8_1_tar_gz

20140523120411_http___lemonjuice_tk_netcat_sh

20140610174516_http___59_63_183_193_280__etc_Test8888

20140614200901_http___kismetismy_name_ktx

20140625032113_http___ftp_mirrorservice_org_sites_ftp_wiretapped_net_pub_security_packet_construction_netcat_gnu_netcat_netcat_0_7_1_tar_gz

20140720005010_http___www_bl4ck_viper_persiangig_com_p8_localroots_2_6_x_cw7_3

To see the full source for some of the scripts downloaded by the attackers you can go to this Github Repo. A couple of my favorite ones.

TTY Replay Sessions:

My absolute favorite feature of Kippo is the ability to replay interactive sessions of attacker activity. Watching these replays gives us an idea of what attackers do once inside a session. For instance almost every session begins with a "w" which shows logged in users and uptime, and then a "uname -a" to show them system details. I made a Youtube series called The Kippo Kronicles a while back to showcase some of these sessions. While I don't have the time necessary to continue putting up videos for each session I have put the output of each session up at this Github Repo.

Here is a fun example:

AWSWeb:~# adduser

adduser: Only one or two names allowed.

AWSWeb:~# useradd

adduser: Only one or two names allowed.

AWSWeb:~# ls

AWSWeb:~# pwd

root

AWSWeb:~# cd /cat /etc/passwd

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash

daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh

bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh

sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh

sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync

games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh

man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh

lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh

mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh

news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh

uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh

proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh

www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh

backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh

list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh

irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh

gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh

nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh

libuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:/bin/sh

richard:x:1000:1000:richard,,,:/home/richard:/bin/bash

sshd:x:101:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin

AWSWeb:~# user

bash: user: command not found

AWSWeb:~# adduser obz

Adding user `obz' ...

Adding new group `obz' (1001) ...

Adding new user `obz' (1001) with group `obz' ...

Creating home directory `/home/obz' ...

Copying files from `/etc/skel' ...

Password: 

Password again: 

Changing the user information for obz

Enter the new value, or press ENTER for the default

        Username []: 

Must enter a value!

        Username []: obz

        Full Name []: ladmin obz

        Room Number []: 1

        Work Phone []: 1234567890

        Home Phone []: 

Must enter a value!

        Home Phone []: 0

        Mobile Phone []: 0

        Country []: cn

        City []: xang

        Language []: mand

        Favorite movie []: 1

        Other []: 1

Is the information correct? [Y/n] y

ERROR: Some of the information you entered is invalid

Deleting user `obz' ...

Deleting group `obz' (1001) ...

Deleting home directory `/home/obz' ...

Try again? [Y/n] y

Changing the user information for obz

Enter the new value, or press ENTER for the default

        Username []: obx

        Full Name []: obx toor

        Room Number []: 1

        Work Phone []: 19089543121

        Home Phone []: 9089342135

        Mobile Phone []: 9089439012

        Country []: cn

        City []: xang

        Language []: manenglish

        Favorite movie []: one

        Other []: twofour

Is the information correct? [Y/n] y

ERROR: Some of the information you entered is invalid

Deleting user `obz' ...

Deleting group `obz' (1001) ...

Deleting home directory `/home/obz' ...

Try again? [Y/n] n

AWSWeb:~# cat adduser obz user cat /etc/passwd

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash

daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh

bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/bin/sh

sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/bin/sh

sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync

games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/bin/sh

man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/bin/sh

lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/bin/sh

mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/bin/sh

news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/bin/sh

uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/bin/sh

proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/bin/sh

www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/bin/sh

backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/bin/sh

list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/bin/sh

irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/bin/sh

gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/bin/sh

nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/bin/sh

libuuid:x:100:101::/var/lib/libuuid:/bin/sh

richard:x:1000:1000:richard,,,:/home/richard:/bin/bash

sshd:x:101:65534::/var/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin

AWSWeb:~# cat /etc/shadow

cat: /etc/shadow: No such file or directory

AWSWeb:~# /etc/init.d\D/ssh start

bash: /etc/init.D/ssh: command not found

AWSWeb:~# /etc/init.D/ssh startd

bash: /etc/init.d/ssh: command not found

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# 

AWSWeb:~# exit

cConnection to server closed.

localhost:~# exit

Connection to server closed.

localhost:~# bye

bash: bye: command not found

localhost:~# exit

Connection to server closed.

localhost:~# admin

bash: admin: command not found

localhost:~# su

localhost:~# ls -l

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2013-02-03 17:11 .

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2013-02-03 17:11 ..

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2009-11-06 11:16 .debtags

-rw------- 1 root root 5515 2009-11-20 09:08 .viminfo

drwx------ 1 root root 4096 2009-11-06 11:13 .aptitude

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  140 2009-11-06 11:09 .profile

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  412 2009-11-06 11:09 .bashrc

localhost:~# pwd

/root

localhost:~# cd /

localhost:/# ls -l

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2013-02-03 17:11 .

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2013-02-03 17:11 ..

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root     0 2009-11-20 08:19 sys

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:42 bin

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:08 mnt

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:08 media

lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    25 2009-11-06 11:16 vmlinuz -> /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.26-2-686

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:09 opt

lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    11 2009-11-06 11:08 cdrom -> /media/cdrom0

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:08 selinux

drwxrwxrwx 1 root root  4096 2009-11-20 08:19 tmp

dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root     0 2009-11-20 08:19 proc

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:41 sbin

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-20 08:20 etc

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  3200 2009-11-20 08:20 dev

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:09 srv

lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    28 2009-11-06 11:16 initrd.img -> /boot/initrd.img-2.6.26-2-686

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:46 lib

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:22 home

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:09 var

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:46 usr

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:39 boot

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-20 09:08 root

drwx------ 1 root root 16384 2009-11-06 11:08 lost+found

localhost:/# cd /home

localhost:/home# ls -l

ldrwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2013-02-03 17:11 .

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2013-02-03 17:11 ..

drwxr-xr-x 1 1000 1000 4096 2009-11-06 11:22 richard

localhost:/home# exit

Connection to server closed.

localhost:~# 

localhost:~# 

localhost:~# 

localhost:~# 

localhost:~# 

localhost:~# 

localhost:~# ssh -D root@http://60.250.65.112/ 1337

The authenticity of host '60.250.65.112 (60.250.65.112)' can't be established.

RSA key fingerprint is 9d:30:97:8a:9e:48:0d:de:04:8d:76:3a:7b:4b:30:f8.

Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes

Warning: Permanently added '60.250.65.112' (RSA) to the list of known hosts.

root@60.250.65.112's password: 

Linux localhost 2.6.26-2-686 #1 SMP Wed Nov 4 20:45:37 UTC 2009 i686

Last login: Sat Feb  2 07:07:11 2013 from 192.168.9.4

localhost:~# uname -a

Linux localhost 2.6.24-2-generic #1 SMP Thu Dec 20 17:36:12 GMT 2007 i686 GNU/Linux

localhost:~# pwd

/root

localhost:~# cd /

localhost:/# ls -l

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2013-02-03 17:19 .

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2013-02-03 17:19 ..

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root     0 2009-11-20 08:19 sys

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:42 bin

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:08 mnt

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:08 media

lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    25 2009-11-06 11:16 vmlinuz -> /boot/vmlinuz-2.6.26-2-686

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:09 opt

lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    11 2009-11-06 11:08 cdrom -> /media/cdrom0

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:08 selinux

drwxrwxrwx 1 root root  4096 2009-11-20 08:19 tmp

dr-xr-xr-x 1 root root     0 2009-11-20 08:19 proc

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:41 sbin

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-20 08:20 etc

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  3200 2009-11-20 08:20 dev

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:09 srv

lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root    28 2009-11-06 11:16 initrd.img -> /boot/initrd.img-2.6.26-2-686

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:46 lib

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:22 home

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-06 11:09 var

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:46 usr

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-08 15:39 boot

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 2009-11-20 09:08 root

drwx------ 1 root root 16384 2009-11-06 11:08 lost+found

localhost:/# cd /root

localhost:~# ls -l

ldrwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2013-02-03 17:19 .

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2013-02-03 17:19 ..

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2009-11-06 11:16 .debtags

-rw------- 1 root root 5515 2009-11-20 09:08 .viminfo

drwx------ 1 root root 4096 2009-11-06 11:13 .aptitude

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  140 2009-11-06 11:09 .profile

-rw-r--r-- 1 root root  412 2009-11-06 11:09 .bashrc

localhost:~# cd /hocd /home/

localhost:/home# ls -l

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2013-02-03 17:20 .

drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 2013-02-03 17:20 ..

drwxr-xr-x 1 1000 1000 4096 2009-11-06 11:22 richard

localhost:/home# exit

Connection to server closed.

localhost:~# exit

Connection to server closed.

localhost:~# 

 Conclusion:

After a year with Kippo, I have learned a lot about what these basic attackers do when connecting to seemingly open ssh hosts. There is plenty more to learn though. I have some plans on building out a larger honeypot infrastructure, and automating some of the data collection and parsing. Additionally I would like to spend more time analyzing the sessions and malware for further trends. I'll keep you all posted!

*Big thanks to Bruteforce Labs for their tools and expertise in honeypots.